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Stefania Arrigoni (Italy), Alberto Lanzavecchia (Italy) 
Does managing an SRI fund cost more? Evidence
from the European financial market 
Abstract 
Authors’ aim is to provide evidence regarding managing costs differences comparing Socially Responsible Investing
(SRI) funds with traditional ones, if any, and if these are influenced by the ethical rating of the fund. The methodology 
is based on a multiple linear regression model in a matched-pair sample of 309 European SRI and non-SRI funds 
managed by the same managing company and a comprehensive sample of 558 European SRI funds. The main findings 
are on size, country, asset class, and ethical rating. Yet, the higher the ethical rating, the lower the TER, especially at 
the highest level of rating. If investors actively select higher ethically rated SRI funds, they will benefit from a lower 
cost charged by specialized asset managers. In investing in “good”, choose the best! 
Keywords: SRI, TER, European financial market. 
JEL Classification: G23, G15. 
Introduction?
The origins of what we now define as Socially 
Responsible Investing (SRI) actually date back to 
the origins of civil societies – or at least to since 
money has existed. The Holy Bible, Quran and 
Torah laid down many directives about how to invest 
money in a “good” way and when investing would be 
deemed unethical (Schueth, 2003). Not surprisingly, 
Ali (2008), Emerson and Mckinney (2010) along with 
Pava (1998) argued that spiritually driven ethics 
motivate individuals to incorporate the highest human 
and spiritual ideals into business conduct. Business 
ethics can be applied every day in all activities in a 
marketplace: customer relations, pricing and profit 
margins, personnel recruiting and promotion, business 
competition and capital investments. 
The motivations of investors who are attracted to 
SRI tend to fall into two broad categories. One 
group feels the need to invest money in a manner 
that does not conflict with their personal values and 
objectives, even to compensate for an otherwise 
hedonistic lifestyle. Another group feels a stronger 
need to place their money to actively support and 
encourage improvements in others’ quality of life or 
in the environment for future generations. The 
average SRI investor belonging to the latter group is 
classified as an “activist” who is more focused on 
what capital can do to catalyze positive change in 
society at large (Schueth, 2003) – e.g. impact 
investing. Strictly speaking, impact investing is a 
niche within SRI markets, totalling in 2012 about 
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US$8.01 billion (Saltuk, 2013) and €8.75 billion 
(Emson, 2013) respectively in US and in European 
market – a market share of 0.21 and 0.13 percent, 
respectively. 
The successful launch of Friends Provident 
Stewardship Fund in 1984 and, since then, many other 
ethical investment funds have made ethical investment 
widely available to retail investors (Cowton, 1999,  
p. 60). While investments in “traditional” fund 
assets in Europe declined by a compounded 
average annual rate of 2.08 percent during the 
2007-2011 period (Delbecque and Healy, 2013), 
over the same period, SRI retail funds never 
suffered relevant outflows, increasing at an 
impressive compounded average annual growth rate 
of 14.70 percent (Bono et al., 2012). 
The growing of the SRI market has been driven by 
“a desire to redefine the relationship between 
corporations and society” and a desire to “find 
mechanisms to exercise a quasi-regulatory power 
over corporations without the direct intervention of 
government” (Louche and Lydenberg, 2006, p. 10).  
There are two main streams of research about SRI 
funds: a quantitative and a qualitative one. The 
former mainly analyzes a fund’s performance and risk 
exposure compared to traditional funds (Mallin et al., 
1995; Adamo et al., 2010; Blanchett, 2010; Managi, 
Okimoto and Matsuda, 2012); the latter focuses on 
descriptive information and methodologies to evaluate 
their sustainability and social impacts. A forthcoming 
frontier is now where the two streams of research 
meet: is there any relation between ethical-driven 
practice and quantitative results? 
This study lies at that borderline, addressing the 
relationship between the “quality” of SRI funds 
(measured by a rating) and their managing costs, 
expecting that SRI funds, ceteribus paribus, would 
bear higher costs compared to traditional. We derive 
this hypothesis from two assumptions: 1) fund 
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manager’s objective is profit maximization and  
2) there are higher screening and information costs 
within SRI universe (Bauer et al., 2006) which yield to 
economies of scale (Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 
2012; Jones et al., 2008). As long as the average SRI 
investor is not an activist (Emson, 2013, p. 25) who 
is “not likely to forego a higher return on their 
investment in return for a social screen” (Rosen et 
al., 1991, p. 230), the former assumption would lead 
asset managers to charge extra costs offset by the 
investors’ feeling of having done a “good and right 
thing”. The latter assumption would lead to higher 
managing costs since the average ethical fund’s 
assets under management is smaller than the 
average conventional fund size (Kempf and Osthoff, 
2008). Hence, our aim is to provide evidence 
regarding cost differences compared to traditional 
funds, if any, and if those are influenced by the 
ethical commitment of the fund. 
Intonti and Iannuzzi (2010) investigated the 
relationship between the ethical commitment of 
Italian SRI funds and the “Global Expense Ratio”. 
In this paper, we extend their perspective to the 
European market by applying a different methodology 
based on a multiple linear regression model (Gujarati, 
1999) in a matched-pair sample (Mallin et al., 1995) 
of 309 European SRI and non-SRI funds managed 
by the same managing company and a full sample of 
558 European SRI funds. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into five 
sections. In Section 1, we provide a literature review 
on the SRI industry. In Section 2, we describe our 
data and variables as well as provide descriptive 
statistics. In Section 3, we examine the SRI funds’ 
cost, what drives them and, ultimately, if SRI fund 
costs are different from traditional ones. In the final 
section we provide concluding remarks. 
1. Literature review 
Given the increasing importance of SRI funds and 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues, 
there is a large body of literature covering various 
topics related to these matters, broadly identified 
within two main streams of research. 
1.1. Quantitative analysis. Most of the research 
investigate quantitative aspects of SRI funds, based 
on the assumption that, since SRI funds restrict 
portfolio diversification due to a selective screening 
not based on risk and return à la Markovitz, they are 
willing to bear some inefficiencies in terms of risk-
adjusted performance (Funari, 2011). Yet, several 
studies show that the performance of SRI funds is 
not significantly different from those of 
conventional funds or is even better (Mallin et al., 
1995; Sauer, 1997; Statman, 2000; Bello, 2005; Bauer 
et al., 2005; Kreander et al., 2005; Benson et al., 2006; 
Gregory and Whittaker, 2007; Becchetti and Ciciretti, 
2009; Rathner, 2013). Bauer et al. (2005), analyzing 
financial markets in the USA, the UK and Germany, 
found an interesting result regarding the presence of 
the learning effect: older SRI funds performed better 
than younger ones. However, Renneboog et al. 
(2011) reported a negative performance for SRI funds 
compared to conventional funds: SRI funds in many 
European and Asian-Pacific countries strongly 
underperform regarding the domestic benchmark 
portfolio, although UK and US funds do not 
significantly underperform their benchmark. 
Regarding risk exposure, Bauer et al. (2005), 
Gregory and Whittaker (2007) and Kempf and 
Osthoff (2008) found that SRI funds have lower 
market sensitivity than conventional funds. 
1.2. Qualitative analysis. Qualitative analyses can 
be divided into two main fields of research: studies 
aimed to describe the characteristics of SRI funds and 
the behavior of SRI investors; studies that investigates 
how sustainable and ethical an SRI fund is.
Louche and Lydenberg (2006) investigated the main 
difference between European and United States 
markets, exploring historical, cultural and political 
drivers of SRI. Even if the two markets share 
purposes and goals, they outline differences in the 
actors involved, definitions, methodology and 
strategies implemented by SRI funds. Sandberg et 
al. (2009) explored the heterogeneity of SRI, 
identifying four levels on which heterogeneity can be 
explained: terminological, definitional, strategic and 
practical. The authors also pinpointed three possible 
explanations for these heterogeneities, such as cultural 
and ideological differences between regions, 
differences in values, norms and ideologies between 
SRI stakeholders, and the SRI market setting. Louche 
et al. (2012) more recently examined the attitude of 
religious organizations towards responsible 
investment, finding that religious values are an 
important driver and religious investors are pioneers in 
impact investing; nevertheless, religious and investing 
practices vary across regions. Other studies focused on 
the investors’ behavior (Bollen, 2007) and its 
characteristics (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000).  
1.3. An integration: portfolio analysis. An attempt 
for merging qualitative with quantitative research 
started with the analysis of the portfolio holdings of 
an SRI fund (Rudd, 1981; Sauer, 1997; Benson et 
al., 2006). Kempf and Osthoff (2008), testing 
whether SRI funds are conventional funds in 
disguise, discovered good news: SRI funds do have 
a significantly higher ethical ranking than standard 
funds (i.e. they are not conventional funds in 
disguise) and results are not affected by window 
dressing strategies of SRI funds. 
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However, Schwartz (2003), studying mutual funds 
in the USA and Canada, concluded that the ethical 
obligations of some funds are not met and some 
screens are not ethically justified. Moreover, many 
ethical funds do not satisfy the minimum 
requirements of transparency and disclosure. 
Diltz (1995), testing the effects of ethical screening 
on portfolio performance, found ambiguous results, 
leading to the conclusion that ethical screening does 
not penalize or increase portfolio performance.  
Through the applications of evaluation models, it is 
now possible to assign and classify an SRI funds on 
the basis of a qualitative score. 
The seminal study of Geczy et al. (2005) introduces 
the evaluation of the sustainability of an SRI fund, 
developing a list of SRI screening criteria.  
Renneboog et al. (2007), evaluating the impacts of 
screenings on funds’ performance, concluded that a 
higher screening yields a higher future performance. 
Intonti and Iannuzzi (2010) developed a model for 
the attribution of an “Ethical Rating” by integrating 
screening and selection criteria with transparency 
and disclosure ones. Funari (2011) developed a 
similar model composed of 35 factors ? negative 
screening, positive screening, guarantee of control 
and transparency. 
1.4. Mutual funds’ fees. Literature on mutual funds’ 
expenses is relatively narrower and it is mainly 
focused on the United States or single countries. 
Studies address the relation between mutual funds’ 
performance and their fees and expenses (Malhotra 
and McLeod, 1997; Siggelkow, 1999; Luo, 2002).  
Khorana et al. (2009) proposed a new measure of 
Total Shareholder Costs (TSCs), which includes the 
total expense ratio plus annualized loads1. Malhotra 
et al. (2007) analyzed the structure of mutual fund 
expenses in the US market and the determinants of 
fund management costs, finding evidence of 
economies of scale in the mutual fund industry.  
To the best of our knowledge, few studies analyze 
how management fees or expense ratio in SRI funds 
impact funds’ performance. Gil-Bazo et al. (2009) 
studied the before-fees and after-fees performance of 
SRI funds in the USA in the period of 1997-2005, 
finding that the US SRI funds had a better 
performance than conventional funds; however, this 
result only holds for SRI funds run by asset 
management companies specialized in SRI. Regarding 
fees, the authors do not find any significant difference 
                                                     
1 Because loads are paid when entering or exiting the fund, it is 
necessary to divide these loads over the investor’s holding period. The 
authors assumed a 5-year holding period in their analysis: TSC= TER + 
(initial load)/5 + (back-end load at five years)/5. 
in fees between SRI and traditional funds, except in 
the case of funds belonging to the same asset 
management company. In this case, the coefficient 
of total ownership cost (TOC2) was negative and 
significant, meaning that investors in SRI funds bear 
lower costs with respect to conventional funds. 
Bauer et al. (2005) studied funds in Germany, the 
UK and the USA, finding that, on average, the Total 
Expense Ratio (TER) of SRI funds was higher than 
those of conventional funds. They also investigated the 
effect of fees on performance, pointing out that 
difference in return between ethical and conventional 
mutual funds is statistically insignificant in all three 
countries. 
Renneboog et al. (2011) applied a similar metho-
dology, finding that the strong under-performance 
discovered in Europe and the Asian-Pacific countries 
was not driven exclusively by management fees.  
Intonti and Iannuzzi (2010), using their own ethical 
evaluation model, analyzed the relationship between 
ethical rating and costs, elaborating a new cost 
proxy named “Global Expense Ratio3” (GER), an 
evolution of the TSC presented by Khorana et al. 
(2009). They compared the fees of 17 SRI funds 
with those of 255 non-SRI funds. Using a simple 
correlation analysis, they did not find any relation 
between pricing and ethical rating. 
This paper is positioned in the stream of research 
that addresses the issue of SRI funds’ production 
costs and their ethical rating, widening the 
perspective to the European market. 
2. Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
2.1. Sampling and data. This study is focused on 
the European financial market since, according to 
Louche and Lydenberg (2006), the European and 
United States’ SRI markets show differences in the 
actors involved, definitions, methodologies and 
strategies implemented. 
We set up a comprehensive list of SRI products 
distributed within the European financial market by 
combining different sources: Bloomberg, Eurosif
(2013), Vigeo, Novethic (2013) and the two Social 
Investment Forum (Sif) organizations, namely AFG 
(2013) and FNG (2013). 
We started from 1,002 funds included in Bloomberg’s 
classification of “Sector Fund Sociality Resp” and 
“Sector Fund-Environment Friend”; then we filtered 
                                                     
2 Total ownership cost is similar to total shareholder cost, presented by 
Khorana et al. (2009) and it is calculated as TOC = expense ratio + 
(total load/7). 
3 GER = (management fee/NAV) + (initial load/5) + (back load/5).
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only Open-end Fund (OEIC in the UK, SICAV1 and 
FCP in France), totalling 901 funds. We also excluded 
193 funds due to missing or unavailable data; 246 
funds were not eligible since they were environ-
mentally focused2 only and/or did not apply any ESG 
or exclusions criteria (e.g. they were only 
“masqueraded” as SRI). We then excluded all 
institutional funds, money-market funds and funds 
with passive portfolio management (e.g. indexed 
funds), ending up with 243 funds. Combining these 
243 funds with the investment list provided by Vigeo 
and two local Sifs, Eurosif and Novethic, we built up 
our comprehensive sample of 558 SRI funds. 
Publicly available data on costs charged to a fund by 
a fund manager are typically measured by TER ?
the ratio of the funds’ total operating costs to its 
average net asset value. The European Commission3
has recommended the use of TER as a common 
European measure for expressing ongoing fund 
charges. Yet, TER includes the annual management 
fee, the performance fee and any additional cost 
borne by the managing company to run a fund (e.g. 
administration costs, depository duties, registration, 
regulatory, custodian, auditing and other operational 
fees). However, TER does not include transaction 
costs (e.g. brokerage fees and taxes) and financial 
costs (e.g. interests on borrowing and payments due 
to derivative instruments), entry/exit commissions or 
any other charges directly paid by investors (The 
Committee of European Securities Regulators, 2005). 
Consequently, TER does not consider the full cost 
born by investors. Actually, since costs charged to a 
fund are mainly operating and management expenses 
(Intonti and Iannuzzi, 2010), TER might be a good 
proxy for the cost indirectly born by investors. 
Unlike other authors who used a specific proxy 
variable to include front-load and back-load fees 
(Intonti and Iannuzzi, 2010; Khorana et al., 2009; 
Gil-Bazo et al., 2009), in this article, we use TER 
provided by Bloomberg and Morningstar as of 31 
December 2012 (time series are not available) to 
investigate the costs charged by fund managers to 
asset portfolios. 
                                                     
1 A société d’investissement à capital variable (SICAV) is an open-
ended collective investment scheme characterized by a managing 
company which sells and buy-back shares on demand. 
2 Green funds are mutual funds or other investment vehicles that invest 
in firms that might produce a positive impact on the environment. The 
ethical rationale is weaker compared to the clear-cut industry 
segmentation that defines them. For an overview of the green funds’ 
market through a comparison of their performance and risk, see Adamo 
et al. (2014). 
3 European Commission Recommendations 2004/383/EC and 
2004/384/EC. These recommendations provide guidance to the 
implementation of two of the most significant sets of changes to the 
UCITS legislation brought about by directives 2001/107/EC and 
2001/108/EC, the so-called UCITS III.
Market data and information providers were 
Bloomberg, Morningstar and funds’ websites ? data 
are at the single-fund level. Since most data were 
available only for the year 2012 (e.g. no time series 
data were available), we implemented a cross-
sectional analysis instead of a panel-data study. 
Funds are characterized by asset class type, size, 
TER, dividend policy, type of investors (e.g. 
institutional or retail) and other control variables 
described further on in the regression model. Since the 
cost structure of institutional funds is considerably 
different from retail ones, we decided to select the 
latter only. We are aware that institutional investors 
continue to drive the SRI market with an even higher 
market share than in 2011 (Eurosif, 2014); however, 
we fully agree with Eurisif’s concern about the 
weakness of the retail SRI market as a market 
failure. In fact, our ultimate aim is to give insights 
on SRI industry to the general public.  
Yet, we did not control for different classes (e.g., 
retail, high net worth individuals, no load or front 
load, etc.) within funds for two main reasons: 1) the 
lack of a non ambiguous and not overlapping 
definition for each class; 2) the poor statistical 
significance given by a limited number of 
observation within each class. Last, but not least, 
our dataset does not include such information for all 
selected funds. 
2.1.1. Sample selection. We applied a methodology 
known as the “matched-pair sample approach” 
(Mallin et al., 1995; Gil-Bazo et al., 2009) matching 
two funds within the same management company 
that differentiate themselves only by screening 
criteria run by fund managers – other things being 
equal. This methodology differs from Kreander et 
al. (2005) since these authors matched funds among 
different managing companies randomly, while we 
matched SRI funds with a peer fund within the same 
managing company. Since our focus is on costs 
comparison in a ceteris paribus condition, by 
comparing funds within the same investing house 
we offset the asset management general policies 
derived from the company’s cost structure. Actually, 
the resources, policies and culture of management 
companies play an important role in the 
determination of fees, costs and performance (Gil-
Bazo et al., 2009). Moreover, economies of scale 
and scope might influence costs too. Matching funds 
from the same managing company filters out all 
these issues. Focusing only on the structural features 
of the funds (e.g. fund type, asset class, dividend 
policy, investment universe), we were able to match 
309 SRI funds out of 558. 
We excluded 249 funds for two reasons. The first 
one is that some managing companies are “fully SRI 
oriented”, so they did not offer any non-SRI products. 
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Thus, 70 funds from 13 managing companies were 
excluded during the matching process. The second 
reason is that, for 179 funds, it was impossible to 
find a non-SRI correspondent under the ceteris 
paribus condition. 
2.2. Ethical rating. We analyzed each SRI fund 
using content analysis methodology ? a “research 
method for the subjective interpretation of the 
content of text data through the systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes 
or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). We 
collected data from the companies’ websites, Eurosif, 
National Sif Organizations and using different 
references (e.g. annual reports, Eurosif Transparency 
Code filled by the funds, Social and Sustainable 
Reports and documents, Internal Sustainable Codes 
etc.). We were therefore able to fill our model and 
assign to each fund a grade – an “ethical rating”. 
Starting from literature (Renneboog et al., 2011; and 
2007; Intonti and Iannuzzi, 2010; Funari, 2011; 
Geczy et al., 2005), we combined different models 
to create our own evaluation model. Our ethical 
rating evaluation model is based on five assessment 
dimensions (Appendix A). 
Section A is dedicated to the “screening criteria” 
used by SRI fund’s asset managers. There is no 
distinction between positive and negative criteria 
given that those criteria depend on human morale ?
what is good or what is bad. 
Section B focuses on methodology in the screening 
process: one point is assigned for each distinction 
between negative and positive criteria and the 
differentiation at States or firms level ? some 
criteria could refer only to one of them or both (e.g. 
a fund manager might decide to exclude 
governments involved in weapons but not to screen, 
or exclude, firms implicated in the same business). 
Section C focuses on the internal and external 
“control of the screening process”. Regarding the 
composition and functions of the sustainable 
committee, the score was 0 without any information, 
0.5 with less or equal to three external members and 
defined functions, and 1 with more than three. 
Section D concerns “other sustainable characteristics” 
of funds, such as Eurosif adherence, presence of an 
internal sustainable code and an in-house SRI 
research team. As Gil-Bazo et al. (2009) noticed, 
SRI funds that outsourced social research are not 
likely to differ too much from conventional funds. 
For this reason, we decided to emphasize in-house 
SRI research, assigning a positive score. The score is 0 
or 1, except for: profit allocation to development 
project (i.e. 0 without any information, 0.5 with 
general information about the allocation, 1 with 
specific guidance), information about a fund’s 
leverage (i.e. 0 with no information, 0.5 if higher 
than 1.5, 1 if lower than 1.5) and the presence of a 
benchmark (i.e. 0 without a benchmark, 0.5 with a 
non-SRI benchmark, 1 with an SRI benchmark). 
Section E refers to “compliance, transparency and 
the availability of information”. Since there is not 
yet a European framework to define common rules 
regarding SRI, we selected a set of elements that 
covers transparency and compliance issues 
respecting (potential) investors. The score was 0 
without information, 0.5 if the information was 
unclear and 1 otherwise. 
To avoid any valuation bias, especially in Section 
E, we analized each fund, and then we simply 
averaged the score. Overall, the model assigned a 
maximum rating of 56 points (Section A, 28 points; 
Section B, 4 points; Section C, 5 points; Section D, 11 
points; Section E, 8 points). The final score is then 
standardized in a scale from 0% to 100%: the higher 
the score, the more ethical the fund. 
2.3. Summary statistics. Our sample includes funds 
from 13 European countries. Of them, eight are EU 
member states within the Eurozone, four are EU 
member states outside the Eurozone and two are 
non-EU countries (i.e. Norway and Switzerland). 
France and Luxembourg experience the higher 
concentrations of SRI funds, 72 and 111 
respectively (Appendix B and Appendix C). The 
former is driven by a set of regulatory requirements 
which altogether have favored the development of 
SRI and, more widely, of CSR among companies 
in the country (Eurosif, 2012); the latter is biased 
by structural reasons given that favorable bank 
secrecy and tax laws, as well as its central 
location, fuel Luxembourg to be a European 
mutual fund hub (Korana et al., 2005). In fact, 
fund might be distributed in more than one 
country, since a fund could be domiciled in one 
country, managed in a second one and distributed 
in a third one, not mandatory only within Europe. 
Therefore, defining the SRI market is not 
straightforward since asset managers are easily 
located, whereas final investors are not (Eurosif, 
2012). Hence, we decided to allocate each fund to 
the country of domicile. This choice explains the 
high number of funds domiciled in Luxembourg. 
Table 1. Summary statistics for the matched-pair 
sample (Panel A) and full sample (Panel B) on the 
TER (as percentage on net asset value) and size (in 
euro millions) 
Panel A. Matched-pair sample
N MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
SRI 309
TER 1.601 0.660 1.660 0.030 5.190
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Table 1 (cont.). Summary statistics for the matched-
pair sample (Panel A) and full sample (Panel B) on 
the TER (as percentage on net asset value) and size 
(in euro millions) 
Panel A. Matched-pair sample 
N MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
SIZE (mln €) 164.10 255.91 82.22 1.22 1959.40
NO SRI 309    
TER 1.575 0.6369 1.610 0.030 5.270
SIZE (mln €) 363.44 505.41 140.14 1.20 3 299.24
Overall 618    
TER 1.588 0.648 1.630 0.030 5.27
SIZE (mln €) 263.77 412.50 115.60 1.20 3299.24
Panel B. Total SRI sample 
n MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
SRI 558    
TER 1.555 0.693 1.580 0.010 5.490
SIZE (mln €) 167.60 270.88 76.12 1.219 2195.07
On average, the TER for SRI funds is higher than 
the TER for conventional funds: 1.601% vs 1.575% 
respectively. Looking deeper into countries, SRI funds 
in France, the UK and Norway show a lower TER 
compared to the matched conventional ones in the 
same country. France and Luxembourg recorded the 
highest level of TER for No-SRI funds (see Table 2B 
in Appendix). 
SRI funds might bear higher costs due to the 
screening and selection process. Furthermore, this 
activity is often outsourced to external advisors and 
agencies for practical reasons. Advisors and rating 
agencies often provide unbiased and independent 
certifications of a fund’s sustainable performance. 
In our sample, 44% of the 558 funds simultaneously 
adopted in-house research teams and external 
advisors; 21% relied on external advisors only. 
However, 30% relied on in-house research teams 
only, and 3% of the funds did not disclose any 
information on this issue. 
The mean and standard deviation are useful to 
summarize a set of observations. However, when 
data have a skewed distribution, it is often 
preferable to quote centiles. Hence, Table 2 
provides the decile distribution of the ethical rating 
in a matched sample (Panel A), full SRI sample 
(Panel B) and correspondent average TER for each 
decile ? the higher the decile class, the higher the 
ethical rating. Table 2 shows that 60% of funds are 
concentrated in the fifth and sixth deciles; at the 
lowest and highest deciles, the average TER 
assumes the highest and lowest value respectively. 
Table 2. Ethical rating decile distribution 
Panel A Panel B
Matched sample Full SRI sample
N° Avg TER N° Avg TER
D1 0.0 – 0.1 - - - -
D2 0.1 – 0.2 2 1.5 3 1.5
D3 0.2 – 0.3 16 2.0625 19 1.9174
D4 0.3 – 0.4 49 1.5259 71 1.6156
D5 0.4 – 0.5 109 1.6694 172 1.7326
D6 0.5 – 0.6 77 1.6932 170 1.5412
D7 0.6 – 0.7 26 1.7346 70 1.1019
D8 0.7 – 0.8 30 1.368 53 1.4158
D9 0.8 – 0.9 - - - -
D10 0.9 – 1.0 - - - -
TOT 309 1.601 558 1.555
Table 3 shows the average partial rating and the 
average final rating by country. Section A, which 
represents the screening criteria applied by the fund, 
represents almost 30% of the score of SRI funds. This 
result was expected, since this section accounts for up 
to 50% in our model (up to 28 points out of 56). 
Table 3. Incidence of different sections by country 
Country Section A Section B Section C Section D Section E Total
Austria 29% 4% 5% 7% 10% 54%
Belgium 27% 7% 8% 10% 11% 62%
Denmark 29% 1% 5% 6% 8% 49%
France 22% 2% 3% 10% 10% 47%
Germany 30% 5% 4% 7% 8% 54%
Italy 29% 5% 6% 8% 7% 55%
Luxembourg 25% 3% 3% 9% 9% 49%
Netherlands 27% 3% 5% 9% 10% 54%
Norway 23% 2% 4% 9% 9% 46%
Spain 20% 0% 2% 8% 4% 33%
Sweden 29% 4% 7% 9% 9% 57%
Switzerland 28% 3% 4% 7% 9% 51%
UK 30% 2% 3% 8% 9% 52%
TOT 27% 3% 5% 8% 9% 51%
UK and Germany registered the highest value in 
Section A, while in France, despite the development 
of its domestic market, funds achieved a lower level. 
This means that in the former countries managers 
are more actively involved in running screening and 
sections activities than those in France – actually 
French legislation is more concerned on 
transparency and disclosure (e.g. Section E). 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 12, Issue 2, 2015
57
Since religious organizations have a leading role in 
the SRI industry by applying negative screening 
based on religious principles (Louche et al., 2012), 
our results are not surprising. 
3. Do investment managers charge more  
for SRI funds? 
3.1. Regression model. Our analysis consists of a 
cost comparison between ethical funds and 
traditional funds, controlling for other things being 
equal. The methodology is based on multiple linear 
regression (Gujarati, 1999).  
The dependent variable is the Total Expense Ratio 
(TER), defined as the ratio of a fund’s total expenses 
over average net asset values at time t (Malhotra and 
McLeod, 1997).  
More formally, our model is written as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
TER ETHICALRATING SIZE COUNTRY TYPE CLASS
SHARE UNIVERSE SIZE SRI CURRENCY SRI COUNTRY SRI
TYPE SRI CLASS SRI SHARE SRI UNIVERSE
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ) ,i iSRI ??
(1)
where TERi is the Total Expense Ratio in fund i as of 
31 December 2012, ETHICALRATINGi is the result of 
our evaluation model for the fund i, CURRENCYi is 
the currency fund i as quoted, SIZEi is the fund i’s 
assets under management in millions Euro, 
COUNTRYi refers to the domicile country of the fund 
i, TYPEi is a variable referred to as the type of fund i
(i.e. open-end fund or SICAV), CLASSi refers to the 
asset class of the fund i (i.e. equity, balanced, debt), 
SHAREi is a variable referring to the dividend policy of 
the fund i (e.g. accumulation or distribution), 
UNIVERSEi refers to the geographical area where the 
fund i invests (e.g. Asia, Emerging, Eurozone, Global). 
All variables, with the exception of TERi and 
ETHICALRATINGi, are also multiplied by the 
dummy variable SRIi to isolate the ethical effect 
of the SRI funds within the matched pair sample. 
Model [2] is written to evaluate the relation between 
the ethical rating of the SRI funds and their TER in 
the full SRI sample: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 .
i i i i i i
i i i
TER ETHICALRATING SIZE COUNTRY TYPE CLASS
SHARE UNIVERSE
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
                              
(2) 
Hence, Model [1] uses the matched-pair sample of 309 
SRI funds, while Model [2] uses all 558 SRI funds. 
To avoid the dummy variable trap and multi-
collinearity issues, we excluded for the country 
dummy variables, France, which represents the most 
developed and advanced SRI market in Europe; for 
the investment universe, Europe, the main target 
market, together with the Eurozone1; for asset class 
one, we excluded the dummy with less numerosity. 
Nevertheless, given the different compositions of 
the two samples related to our models, we decided 
to exclude the balanced category in both regressions 
to facilitate comparisons and make the two models 
as homogeneous as possible. In the case of dummy 
variables with only two characteristics (i.e. fund-
type variable and share-type variable), there was not 
any specific reason to exclude one dummy rather 
than the other.
3.2. Results and discussion. 3.2.1. Matched pair 
sample. Results for the matched pair sample are 
shown in Table 4, Panel A. We found negative 
and significant coefficients for SIZE in both 
models meaning that an increase in the fund assets 
under management generates a decrease of TER. 
                                                     
1 As a robustness check, we run the regressions also excluding the 
Eurozone instead of Europe: the significance of the other coefficients was 
the same, meaning that Europe and the Eurozone have the same effect.  
This evidence corroborates the study of Malhotra 
et al. (2007) and Khorana et al. (2009) and it is 
not surprising as long as most of the managing 
costs (such as research) are fixed, consequently, 
economies of scale rise. 
Although the average TER in SRI funds is slightly 
higher than the one in non-SRI funds (Table 1), 
Model [1] shows that such difference is not 
statistically significant, except at higher levels of 
ETHICAL RATING – in D7 deciles. This is a 
welcome and unexpected evidence: investors in SRI 
funds are not going to bear higher managing and 
operating costs compared to non-SRI ones, other 
things being equal. However, some significant 
difference arises at the country level, funds type and 
investment zone. 
Concerning COUNTRY, we found that five are not 
significantly different from the base case (i.e. 
France), namely Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden. The result in the UK is 
significant only using the ETHICAL RATING in 
deciles. This discrepancy from the other significant 
values can be explained with the composition of the 
sample since splitting the ETHICAL RATING into 
deciles reduces the number of funds in each 
category; thus, some coefficients might not be 
significant anymore. All the other countries have 
negative and significant coefficients, that is, these 
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countries have domiciled cheaper funds than the 
ones in France. In particular, funds domiciled in 
Belgium and Norway bear the lowest costs 
compared to French ones. Luxembourg lastly, with 
the lowest significant coefficient, represents the 
closest market to France. Differences within 
European countries could be explained by financial 
markets’ structural characteristics, such as the 
quality of legal systems, laws on transparency and 
investor protection, the presence of exogenous 
barriers to entry in the market, levels of per-capita 
GDP and educational level (Khorana et al., 2009). 
Looking at CLASS variable, results show that funds 
investing in equities significantly cost more than 
balanced ones and, by contrast, investing in bond 
funds costs less. Moreover, the average TER for 
equity funds is higher (1.83%) than balanced (1.447%) 
and debt funds (0.911%)1 (see Table 4D in Appendix). 
Stock selection and market timing in equity markets 
require more costs in managing investments. This 
result is coherent with Malhotra et al. (2007). 
Looking at SHARE variable on dividend policy, we 
observed a positive coefficient associated with the 
“accumulation” of dividends (“distribution” is the 
reference case), meaning that funds that distribute 
dividends cost less. This is not straightforward: as long 
as dividends reduce a fund’s net asset value – the 
denominator in the TER (the dependent variable) – we 
should expect higher dividends for higher TER – the 
opposite of what we discovered. However, a deeper 
analysis (see Appendix E) revealed that the average 
SIZE in accumulation funds is smaller than the one of 
distribution funds in our sample. Given the technique 
of TER estimation, which is calculated dividing the 
total annual cost by the fund’s average total assets in 
that year, a lower SIZE yields to a higher TER. 
Concerning the UNIVERSE variable, the 
geographical area of investments does not affect the 
fund’s cost structure; nonetheless funds investing in 
emerging countries show a positive and significant 
coefficient – they cost more than funds investing in 
Europe or globally. This might be due to higher 
costs related with selection process and possible 
difficulty of gathering information and data in the 
emerging markets, often characterized by a lack of 
normative regulation and transparency. 
3.2.2. Full SRI funds sample. Panel B of Table 4 
shows the results concerning the full SRI funds 
sample. The most interesting results arise from 
COUNTRY of domicile and ETHICAL RATING 
effects. 
While Model [1] shows that funds domiciled in 
Belgium and Luxembourg significantly cost less 
than the ones domiciled in France, Model [2] shows 
that these conclusions are relaxed. Concerning 
Belgium, the sign of the coefficient turns out to be 
positive (i.e. more costly). In Belgium, SRI funds’ 
retail market is highly concentrated in as much only 
two asset managers own a share of the market 
around 95%; hence, an oligopoly might explain the 
higher costs charged. Yet in all countries, with the 
exception of Norway, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands (in deciles distribution only), the results 
are not statistically significant; so we cannot draw any 
conclusions. While in Norway and in the Netherlands, 
regression coefficient signs are confirmed (lower costs 
than in France), in Luxembourg, the evidence points to 
the opposite: SRI funds charge more costs than French 
ones. SRI funds seem to have no advantage in being 
domiciled in Luxembourg; in contrast, they bear 
higher managing costs. 
Table 4. Explaining SRI mutual fund TER across countries1
 Panel A: Model [1] matched pair analysis Panel B: Model [2] total SRI sample 
TER Total Deciles Total Deciles
SIZE -0.00013** (-2.09) -0.00013** (-2.14) -0.00018** (-2.11) -0.00018** (-2.12)
ETH RATING -0.249 (-1.06) -0.520** (-2.52)
D2 -0.766 (-1.62) -0.396 (-1.21)
D3 -0.045 (-0.13) -- 
D4 -0.481 (-1.46) -0.198 (-1.43)
D5 -0.346 (-1.07) -0.146 (-1.13)
D6 -0.245 (-0.75) -0.142 (-1.08)
D7 -0.632* (-1.85) -0.501*** (-3.55)
D8 -0.509 (-1.44) -0.353** (-2.34)
Austria -0.421** (-2.22) -0.499** (-2.30) -0.096 (-0.56) -0.119 (-0.66)
Belgium -0.723*** (-3.33) -0.782*** (-3.40) 0.136 (1.16) 0.185 (1.46)
Denmark -0.591* (-1.77) -0.665* (-1.92) -0.066 (-0.19) -0.187 (-0.55)
Germany -0.453 (-1.37) -0.539 (-1.55) -0.007 (-0.03) -0.084 (-0.33)
Italy -0.009 (-0.03) -0.093 (-0.31) 0.152 (0.66) 0.027 (0.11)
Luxembourg -0.169* (-1.92) -0.179** (-2.02) 0.198*** (2.77) 0.181** (2.48)
                                                     
1 Table 4D in Appendix shows also summary statistics for TER and size variables.
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Table 4 (cont.). Explaining SRI mutual fund TER across countries 
Panel A: Model [1] matched pair analysis Panel B: Model [2] total SRI sample
TER Total Deciles Total Deciles
the Netherlands -0.254 (-0.66) -0.335 (-0.84) -0.276 (-1.34) -0.427** (-2.06)
Norway -0.887** (-2.27) -0.960** (-2.40) -1.327*** (-3.30) -1.443*** (-3.60)
Spain 0.123 (0.41) 0.102 (0.34) 0.313 (1.01) 0.407 (1.31)
Sweden -0.328 (-1.31) -0.411 (-1.50) -0.064 (-0.25) -0.242 (-0.95)
Switzerland -0.598*** (-2.96) -0.669*** (-3.00) -0.125 (-0.69) -0.257 (-1.41)
UK -0.292 (-1.58) -0.375* (-1.73) -0.277 (-1.61) -0.328* (-1.88)
SICAV 0.056 (0.34) -0.015 (-0.08) -0.009 (-0.06) -0.080 (-0.52)
Equity 0.312*** (2.97) 0.292*** (2.71) 0.442*** (6.19) 0.436*** (6.19)
Debt -0.446*** (-3.71) -0.468*** (-3.81) -0.453*** (-5.46) -0.432*** (-5.24)
Accumulation 0.114* (1.88) 0.112* (1.85) 0.117** (2.42) 0.118** (2.48)
Asia 0.311 (0.87) 0.307 (0.87) 0.139 (0.7) 0.083 (0.42)
Emerging 0.453** (2.55) 0.451** (2.56) 0.285* (1.75) 0.287* (1.76)
EUROzone -0.114 (-1.24) -0.122 (-1.34) -0.060 (-0.80) -0.087 (-1.15)
Global 0.026 (0.35) 0.016 (0.21) 0.020 (0.32) 0.0223 (0.37)
US -0.173 (-0.83) -0.228 (-1.11)
Dummy SRI Yes Yes
Constant 1.610*** (9.62) 1.717*** (7.71) 1.570*** (7.89) 1.593*** (7.14)
R2 0.462 0.480 0.452 0.473
Adj R2 0.421 0.435 0.429 0.445
F-test 11.47 10.69 19.2 16.96
(Prob. > F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 618 618 558 558
Notes: Table 4 reports results from the estimation of the matched pair sample in Panel A and results associated with the total SRI 
sample in Panel B. The column Total refers to the estimations made using the total distribution of ethical rating. The column Deciles refers 
to the estimation made using the deciles distribution of ethical rating. T-stats in round brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Regarding the effect of ETHICAL RATING on the 
TER, we discovered a statistically significant negative 
relation: the higher the rating, the lower the TER. 
Furthermore, analyzing deciles distribution more 
deeply, the evidence is more severe since only at the 
highest level of ethical rating (namely classes D7 and 
D8) TER is significantly lower. This is a good news for 
practitioners and investors: while selecting SRI funds, 
choose the most ethically involved ones; it benefits 
more on ESG and the cost borne by investors!  
3.3. Robustness and significance of models and 
variables. For both models, we tested the presence 
of the heteroscedasticity of standard errors. Using 
the White test (White, 1980), which tests the 
presence of homescedasticity (H0), we were always 
able to accept H0, therefore rejecting the presence of 
heteroscedasticity of standard errors. 
For all regressions, we rejected the null hypothesis 
of no combined significance of the regressors (i.e. 
testing whether any of the betas differs from 0, H0:
?1 = ?2 = ?3 =...= ?K = 0) (Gujarati, 1999). 
Consequently, all the regressions were significant, and 
all the variables were jointly significant. Furthermore, 
Rs squared were relatively high (they are all around 
0.46), which means that explanatory variables explain 
a relevant portion of the model variability.  
Conclusions
This work enlarges the perspective and knowledge 
on SRI funds in the European financial market. We 
developed a specific evaluation model to assign to 
each SRI fund an ethical score – a proxy of its level 
of ethical commitment and sustainability. 
We were concerned about the pricing policy carried 
out by asset managers in SRI funds. Since socially 
responsible investors are willing to invest money – 
either expecting a payoff in other’s people welfare, 
which partially offsets the financial return on 
invested capital, or buying the embedded insurance 
that the use of his/her money shall not conflict with 
personal values and objectives – the industry might 
exploit such an elasticity of fund demand to price. 
Hence, we investigated the relationship between 
SRI funds’ total costs, measured by the Total 
Expense Ratio (TER), and their ethical rating and 
other explanatory independent variables. In plain 
English, we tested if ethical funds bear higher 
costs than traditional ones, other things being 
equal. Our methodology is based on OLS models 
in a sample of 309 matched pairs of SRI funds 
and a full sample of 558 SRI funds distributed in 
Europe.
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Our main findings are: 
? a size effect: the larger the value of assets under 
management, the lower the TER; 
? a country effect: funds domiciled in France cost 
more than funds domiciled in other European 
countries, with the exception of Luxembourg – 
where SRI funds of specialized asset management 
companies do not seem to benefit of any cost 
advantages from being domiciled in this location; 
? an asset class effect: equity investing and bond 
investing are, respectively, more costly and less 
costly than balanced funds; 
? an ethical rating effect: there are no cost 
differences between SRI funds and traditional 
ones; yet, the higher the ethical rating, the lower 
the TER, especially at the highest level of rating. 
The last one is a welcome good news for investors. 
Contrary to our concerns, asset management industry 
is not (yet) exploiting the retail responsible 
investors’ utility function, which overweights the 
“value” over the “price” of SRI products. This 
evidence unveils a hidden reward: if investors 
actively select higher ethically rated SRI funds, they 
will benefit from a lower cost charged by 
specialized asset managers – at least as regards 
operating and managing cost. In investing in 
“good”, choose the best!
Here comes an insight for practitioners and 
information providers: to define and to disclose an 
ethical rating for each SRI product would benefit 
both investors and asset managers. 
However, we did not control for extra costs directly 
paid by investors (e.g. entry/exit commissions, 
brokerage fees or any other charges). Here comes a 
call for future research on spillovers on SRI products 
that might be carried out by selling entities. 
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Appendix
Table 1A. Ethical rating methodology (range 0-56 points) 
A. Screening criteria (max 28 points) 
0-1
(for each single item) 
Alcohol; Tobacco; Gambling; Nuclear power: Firearms (for personal use); Defence contracting (military) weapons and cluster bombs;
Irresponsible foreign operations; Abortion, birth control; Usury, corruption, money laundering; Pornography; Genetic engineering; Harmful 
products and practices for health and environment, CO2 emission, mining; Death penalty; Authoritarian and oppressive regimes; Religious 
criteria; Child labor; Environmental impact and protection, Non-sustainable timber; Products/services and business practice; Animal
protection, furs and industrial farming - Animal testing pharmaceutical or cosmetic; Labor relations and workplace conditions; Human
rights; Diversity and discrimination; Others; Corporate governance; Social risk management; Renewable energy, water control; 
Community involvement/investment; Healthcare. 
B. Methodology (max 4 points) 
0-1
(for each single item) 
Is there a positive and negative screening?; is there a distinction between firms and state?; is there a distinction in positive screening 
between firms or state? is there a distinction in negative screening between firms or state? 
C. Control of the screening process (max 5 points) 
0-1 (for each single 
item) 
Presence of the internal sustainable committee; Presence of others committee of control (stakeholders); Presence of an external advisor, 
certification of composition of the ethical portfolio. 
0-0.5-1 Composition of the internal sustainable committee; Functions of the internal sustainable committee. 
D. Other sustainable characteristic (max 11 points) 
0-1
(for each single item) 
Fund participation in community investment; Adherence to guidelines of EUROSIF - Transparency code; Other certification - label 
(ETHIBEL, NOVETHIC etc.); Adherence to codes and guidelines of other institutions (GRI, National's codes, UN PRI etc.); Presence of an 
internal sustainable code; Shareholder activism and consultation; In-house SRI research; Production of social reports and studies. 
0-0.5-1 
(for each single item) Profit allocation to development project; Leverage; Benchmark. 
E. Compliance, transparency and availability of information (max 8 points) 
0-0.5-1 
(for each single item) 
Availability of information about SRI criteria and screening methodology; Availability of information about portfolio management and
change; Availability of information about references and database; Availability of information about change of SRI criteria; Availability of 
information about stakeholders activism, engagement and voting policy; Availability of information about profit allocation; Are the website 
and the database user-friendly?; Disclosure of portfolio holdings. 
Table 2B. Summary statistics for countries 
COUNTRY SRI NO SRI 
N° Mean TER Mean Size(€ mln) N Mean TER 
Mean size
(€ mln) 
Austria 30 1.330 88.135 30 1.167 126.073
Belgium 16 1.391 68.836 8 1.019 199.510
Denmark 3 1.440 72.050 3 1.090 410.086
France 72 1.628 148.932 71 1.768 233.701
Germany 7 1.387 251.48 3 1.203 100.736
Italy 5 1.648 103.655 5 1.546 754.593
Luxembourg 111 1.845 195.870 124 1.724 433.196
Netherlands 2 1.725 140.675 2 1.640 316.775
Norway 2 0.565 84.276 2 1.165 86.2753
Spain 3 1.923 21.792 3 1.900 237.765
Sweden 7 1.381 166.138 7 1.321 729.785
Switzerland 11 1.505 87.991 11 1.215 291.022
UK 40 1.292 233.875 40 1.389 537.031
TOT 309 1.601 164.097 309 1.575 363.441
Table 3C. Descriptive statistics of funds characteristics sorted by country 
Panel A. SRI funds 
n EURO NO-EURO SICAV OPEN EQUITY BALANCE DEBT ACC DIS
Austria 30 30 0 0 30 15 0 15 15 15
Belgium 16 16 0 12 4 8 0 8 9 7
Denmark 3 0 3 0 3 2 0 1 1 2
France 72 72 0 70 2 52 1 19 45 27
Germany 7 7 0 0 7 4 2 1 0 7
Italy 5 5 0 0 5 2 1 2 3 2
Luxembourg 111 80 31 111 0 87 13 11 76 35
the Netherlands 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2
Norway 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 0
Spain 3 3 0 3 0 1 2 0 3 0
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Table 3C (cont.). Descriptive statistics of funds characteristics sorted by country 
Panel A. SRI funds 
n EURO NO-EURO SICAV OPEN EQUITY BALANCE DEBT ACC DIS
Sweden 7 0 7 0 7 4 2 1 0 7
Switzerland 11 0 11 2 9 6 4 1 8 3
UK 40 1 39 0 40 25 4 11 22 18
TOT 309 216 93 198 111 210 29 70 184 125
Panel B. No SRI funds 
  n EURO NO-EURO SICAV OPEN EQUITY BALANCE DEBT ACC DIS
Austria 30 30 0 0 30 15 0 15 15 15
Belgium 8 8 0 2 6 6 0 2 5 3
Denmark 3 0 3 0 3 2 0 1 1 2
France 71 71 0 71 0 52 1 18 45 26
Germany 3 3 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 3
Italy 5 5 0 0 5 2 1 2 4 1
Luxembourg 124 96 28 120 4 92 14 18 82 42
the Netherlands 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2
Norway 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 0
Spain 3 3 0 3 0 1 2 0 3 0
Sweden 7 0 7 0 7 4 2 1 0 7
Switzerland 11 0 11 2 9 6 4 1 8 3
UK 40 0 40 0 40 25 4 11 21 19
TOT 309 218 91 198 111 211 28 70 186 123
Note: Panel A refers to SRI funds, Panel B refers to matched No-SRI funds in Model (1). 
Table 4D. Descriptive statistics of asset class dummy
Panel A. Equity 
N° MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
Matched sample 421  
TER  1.831 0.592 1.79 0.03 5.27
SIZE (mln €)  238.61 397.62 99.34 1.199 3299.24
Total SRI sample 366 
TER 1.828 0.644 1.8 0.01 5.49
SIZE (mln €) 181.40 295.71 71.89 1.22 2195.07
Panel B. Balanced 
N° MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
Matched sample 57  
TER  1.447 0.368 1.42 0.92 2.6
SIZE (mln €)  380.14 568.86 127.66 8.41 2346.77
Total SRI sample 72 
TER  1.370 0.447 1.26 0.52 2.76
SIZE (mln €) 122.03 254.24 63.32 5.27 1844.55
Panel C. Debt 
N° MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
Matched sample 140  
TER  0.911 0.32 0.895 0.30 1.97
SIZE (mln €)  292.06 372.74 156.89 4.77 2236.07
Total SRI sample 120 
TER 0.834 0.29 0.82 0.15 1.97
SIZE (mln €) 152.84 186.06 94.50 8.19 1220.72
Table 5E. Descriptive statistics for pay-off dummy variable
Panel A. Accumulation 
N° MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
Matched sample 370 
TER  1.678 0.685 1.71 0.19 5.27
SIZE (mln €)  244.50 380.53 104.65 1.20 3299.24
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Table 5E (cont.). Descriptive statistics for pay-off dummy variable
Panel A. Accumulation 
N° MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
Total SRI sample 322 
TER  1.6275 0.753 1.71 0.15 5.49
SIZE (mln €)  150.17 249.48 63.54 1.22 2195.07
Panel B. Distribution 
N° MEAN SD MEDIAN MIN MAX
Matched sample 248 
TER  1.453 0.564 1.51 0.03 3.23
SIZE (mln €)  292.52 455.34 128.41 1.199 3299.24
Total SRI sample 236 
TER  1.392 0.564 1.43 0.01 3.18
SIZE (mln €)  191.38 296.52 103.86 2.19 2195.07
